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1.Introduction 
The role and dimension of the government in a country have been explored from different 
perspectives in the economic literature. The existence of an optimal government share in the 
economy has been subject to considerable theoretical debate and sustained empirical 
assessment. In particular, the literature has been providing possible determinants for the 
different size of government across countries. This kind of studies, in general, focus on 
different single aspects, which are supposed to be the driving force of the overall 
government size with respect to GDP: trade openness (Rodrik, 1998), country size (Alesina 
and Wacziarg, 1998), degree of economic development (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Stein et 
al. 1999), political organization (Persson and Tabellini, 1999; Milesi-Ferretti et al., 2002), 
business cycle volatility (Fatas and Mihov, 2001; Andrés et al. 2007) to name the principal 
ones. Shelton (2007) provides a common empirical framework for the assessment of the 
hypotheses put forward by this literature. 
Within this broad context, the analysis of the size of the government with respect to the 
degree of development has received a relatively larger attention. In particular, the long-run 
relation between government expenditures and economic growth has been a lively topic of 
empirical assessment. The existence of a positive covariance between the two variables was 
first postulated by the German political economist Adolph Wagner. The so called “law of 
increasing state activity” maintained that there is both and absolute and a relative expansion 
of the public sector (including central and local government’s bodies and public enterprises), 
at the cost of the growth in the private sector (Wagner, 1911). This statistical association has 
been interpreted in a loose and a strict way. In a loose sense, Wagner’s law points to a 
positive long-run co-movement between government expenditures and economic growth, 
while in a strict sense, it postulates a long-run elasticity of public spending above unity. 
In this paper we try to make the best use of both cross-section and time-series dimensions of 
a dataset of 23 OECD economies over the period 1970-2006 to test the validity of Wagner’s 
law. We study the relationship between government expenditures and economic growth 
employing the relatively recent panel data techniques of pooled mean group (PMG) 
estimation  which, on the one hand, improve the power of stationarity and cointengration 
tests (low test power is a well known problem which arises when the number of observations     2 
over time is limited, which is usually the case when dealing with public finance data) and, on 
the other hand, allow to extract country-specific information on short-run dynamics while 
maintaining a common specification for the long-run equilibrium relationship (Pesaran et al.; 
1999). Recently, this technique has been successfully applied in both macroeconomic and 
financial empirical research (Bassanini and Scarpetta, 2002; Byrne and Davis, 2005; Loayza 
and Ranciere, 2006). 
The paper provides empirical support to a strict version of the Wagner’s law. In addition, 
also the spirit of the statement of the German economist seems to be backed by our results. 
In fact, the long-run elasticity of government expenditures with respect to GDP turns out to 
be significantly larger than one, this result being confirmed by several robustness checks. By 
looking at country specific cointegration relationships it is also evident that the economies 
which experienced a faster catching-up over the considered time span show a higher 
elasticity. This in turn suggests that indeed the role of government in the economy tends to 
grow as countries become richer. Not only the need for regulatory and protective functions 
grow stronger with economic development, but also the demand of some public goods such 
education and cultural services increase in wealthier economies and can be thought of as 
luxury goods. Finally, a recursive estimation procedure confirms the finding: in the first part 
of the time horizon, in which the rate of economic development was more robust in OECD 
countries, the elasticity of public spending was higher. Starting from a value of 1.30 in the 
first 20 years it slowly declined to 1.03 over the full horizon. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 proposes some preliminary evidence on public 
spending and GDP development; Section 3 reviews the empirical framework of our analysis 
and briefly discusses the pooled mean group estimator properties; Section 4 presents the 
estimation results and the assessment of the Wagner’s law; Section 5 deals with robustness 
checks and focuses on the EU countries sub-group; Section 6 concludes.  
2. Preliminary evidence 
The idea behind Wagner’s law is that goods and services provided by the government, 
including redistribution via transfers and, in particular, the activities of public enterprises, 
would increase with a country’s industrialization since as the economy grows: 1) the 
administrative and protective functions of the state would substitute public for private     3 
activity; 2) there will be a need for increased provision of social and cultural goods and 
services; 3) government intervention would be required to manage and finance natural 
monopolies and to ensure the smooth operation of market forces (Bird, 1971). 
The mentioned reasons suited the period in which the German economist was leaving, 
namely that of the emerging industrial society. Significant changes in the structure of the 
economy and sizeable increase in the wealth of nations characterized the economic 
development of the late XIX Century. However, Wagner’s law has been empirically tested 
over several time spans. In particular, after World War II, public sector assumed an 
increasing role in steering the economic growth in Western countries and the interest in 
Wagner’s  statement gained new momentum. Since then, following the improvement in the 
econometric technique and benefiting from longer time series, many authors tested the law 
with increasing degree of sophistication. Yet, due to paucity of data when dealing with 
public finance, empirical works has long suffered of an inadequate methodological 
framework, especially in early cross-country analyses (Abizadeth and Gray, 1985; Ram, 
1987). It is not surprising that results from these studies have generally been mixed 
supporting further investigation.
2 The use of integration and cointegration analysis has 
improved the reliability of the most recent works, allowing a distinction between a long-term 
relationship and short-run dynamics. However, the range of the investigation has been 
usually limited to single countries evidence or multi-country comparisons (Thornton; 1999, 
Islam; 2001, Akitoby et al.; 2006).  
In this paper we analyze the viability of the law of increasing state activity for 23 
industrialized countries from 1970 to 2006. The dynamics of government spending over the 
selected time span is remarkable. From the late 1960s the establishment of a welfare state 
induced a rapid increase in the size of government. The surge in expenditures on public 
pensions, income support, health care and education lasted at least two decades reaching a 
peak in the early 1990 in the vast majority of industrialized countries. Figure 1 depicts for 
the G7 economies the development in the share of  total government expenditures to GDP. 
For all the countries the share in 2006 is below the maximum, and it is close to it only for 
France. As already mentioned, there is clear evidence of an upward trend till early 1990s, 
                                                           
2 Peacock and Scott (2000) provide a critical survey on the empirical literature. 
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then the share of total government spending over GDP declined significantly at least for the 
European countries, most likely reflecting the start of EMU third phase and the functioning 
of the Stability and Growth Pact. For the US the share seems to be relatively constant over 
time. From a value of 32.3% in 1970, the shared peaked at 38.5 in 1992 and then dropped to 
36.5 at the end of the horizon. However, only for Canada and Japan is the value of the ratio 
in 2006 smaller than in 2000, suggesting a possible reversal of the declining trend started 
around mid 1990s. 
Figure 1 
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In the paper we do not investigate the implication of Wagner’s law about the sustainability 
of growing public expenditure. Of course, a positive relationship would imply a similar 
development in the asset side of the public balance sheet and an the strict law would lead to 
an implausible explosive path for the share of public spending over GDP. However, it is 
interesting to test the relation over a limited but relatively long time span in order to gauge 
the macroeconomic evolution of a country or the joint development of similar economies.  
In addition we neglect the issues of public sector efficiency or the usefulness of government 
activities. However, the finding of the paper that the positive relationship between 
government expenditures and GDP is declining over time might suggest an adjustment     5 
towards lower level of public spending in industrial economies, most likely linked also to an 
improvement in the quality of good and services provided and in public sector efficiency 
(Afonso et al., 2005) 
3.The empirical framework 
Our empirical strategy is the following. We first run the relevant tests to assess the degree of 
integration of government expenditures and GDP time series and then we look for the 
existence of a cointegration relationship. As a second step, we run the PMG estimation 
following Pesaran et al. (1999), jointly determining the different short-run dynamics and the 
common long-run relationship. 
We rely on data for the 23 following OECD countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Great Britain, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
South Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland 
and USA. Data are gathered on yearly basis from 1970 to 2006, with the exception of 
Portugal (1978-2006) and South Korea (1974-2006). The main source for both public 
spending and GDP dynamics is Economic Outlook by OECD, while Government Financial 
Statistics by IMF has been used for Switzerland and New Zealand, and AMECO by 
European Commission for EU countries’ population. 
In the empirical literature Wagner’s law has been tested with reference to different measures 
of both government spending and economic development. It is however common to rely on 
the broadest definition of government, including all public activities, while it is less clear 
whether the economy’s GDP is the most appropriate counterpart or it has to be considered 
together with the demographic development (i.e., in per-capita term). In addition, also the 
nominal versus real definition of the two variables has been challenged by different authors. 
In this paper we propose a baseline analysis in which general government total expenditures 
and GDP per-capita are used in nominal terms. In a robustness section we check for changes 
in the definition of both public spending and economic development. In addition to some 
stability tests, we allow for the possibility of a level relationship between government 
expenditures and GDP and we consider both variables in real terms. Finally, we also 
consider the restricted sample of the 14 EU countries.      6 
The assessment of the Wagner’s law is conducted in the paper via the relatively new panel 
estimation technique of pooled mean group regressions proposed in Pesaran et al. (1999).  
This methodology can be placed between two other general estimation procedures employed 
when dealing with panels with large time-series and cross-sectional dimensions. On the one 
hand, equations can be estimated country by country and the mean of the coefficients used as 
consistent estimate of the average of the parameters (Mean Group Estimation, MG). This 
estimator, however, does not exploit the cross-country dimension of the sample to take 
advantage of the opportunity given by the fact that at least some parameters may be the same 
across countries. On the other hand, there is the traditional (dynamic) fixed effect estimator 
(FE) which allows the intercepts to differ across countries while all other slope parameters 
are constrained to be the same. However, this kind of pooling does not allow to differentiate 
between short- and long-run dynamics. In addition, it often leads to inconsistent parameter 
estimates (unless the slopes are indeed the same) and this inconsistency does not disappear 
when the size of both cross-section and time-series dimension increases.  
A major advantage of PMG estimation methodology over the standard dynamic FE 
modeling is that it allows the short-run dynamic specification to vary across countries. With 
respect to the MG estimates it uses the cross-section dimension of the dataset to take into 
account the fact that certain parameters (i.e., the long-run elasticities) might be the same 
across group. In addition, the PMG estimation technique is well suited to empirically test the 
validity of the Wagner law for at least two other reasons. First, it allows to determining a 
testable unique long-run relationship across-countries. In particular, we can assess whether 
there are differences among countries in the cointegrating vector or the working hypothesis 
of a homogeneous long-run relation à la Wagner is valid (independently from being strict or 
loose). This is done by statistically comparing the MG and the PMG estimates via a 
Hausman-type test. Second, by starting from a general autoregressive distributed lags 
(ARDL) modeling, it allows for some degree of endogeneity in the variables. Adequately 
selecting the lag length of both government expenditures and GDP in the ARDL model is 
sufficient to correct for the problem of endogenous regressors and maintain the asymptotic 
distribution of the estimators of the long-run parameters (Pesaran and Shin, 1999).  
As pointed out in Peacock and Scott (2000), the cointegrating relationship itself is the best 
econometric translation of the mutual evolution of government spending and economic 
development that Wagner had in mind when formulating his law. Cointegration refers to a     7 
joint long-run pattern and does not imply causality. Thus, a test of the (loose) Wagner’s law 
is just the statistical evidence of a cointegrating relationship with a positive coefficient. In 
addition, the strict Wagner’ law can be easily assessed by checking whether the long-run 
elasticity is significantly larger than 1. 
To exploit the benefit of the PMG estimation we must however first check two conditions: 1) 
both government spending and per-capita GDP are non-stationary series; 2) a cointegrating 
relationship exists between the two I(1) variables. 
Table 1 shows stationarity and cointegration tests. In the upper part we report the results 
stemming from the most commonly used panel unit root tests. They are run for both the 
levels of the variables and for the first differences. In addition, given the possible existence 
of cross-country correlation of errors due to common factors (possibly affecting the variables 
in the same way) we run the tests also on demeaned variables. Finally, to control for higher 
degree of cross-country correlation, the CIPS (cross-sectional augmented Im-Pesaran-Shin) 
test proposed by Pesaran (2007) is computed for lags 1 to 4.
3 The tests have different null 
hypotheses, but, apart from the Levin-Lin-Chu test run on raw data, which however is valid 
under the strong assumption of a common unit root process for all the countries, they all 
clearly suggest that the two variables are integrated of order 1. 
The next step following the assessment of the degree of integrations of the time series is that 
of looking for a cointegrating relationship among the non-stationary variables. This is done 
in order to avoid possible spurious correlation when relying on regressions involving 
variables in level. The Kao and the two Pedroni tests for panel cointegration are reported in 
the lower part of Table 1. The null hypothesis of absence of cointegration could be easily 
rejected in our sample at standard confidence values. 
The two preliminary steps above are important to reassure us that we are employing the 
correct econometric estimation procedure. As already suggested, running a regression 
(single-country or panel) on the levels of variables can be misleading if the time series are 
non-stationary.  Spurious correlation among variables is the most likely outcome even if they 
are not linked by any long-run relationship. On the other hand, regressing the first difference 
                                                           
3 The critical values tabulated by Pesaran (2007) of the CIPS test for a panel with T=30 and N=20 are -2.20 
(5%) and -2.38 (1%). 
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of the variables when instead a long-run equilibrium relationship does exist leads to the well 
known problem of omitted variables specification. In fact, what is missing in this kind of 
regressions is precisely the error correction term. 
Table 1  
Stationarity and cointegrating properties of time series 
                          
  PER-CAPITA GDP  PUBLIC EXPENDITURES 
                 
                          
  Raw  Demeaned  Raw  Demeaned 
                 
                          
Ho: No unit root                
Hadri   14.107  (0.000)  12.872  (0.000)  14.135  (0.000)  12.136  (0.000) 
                 
                          
Ho: Unit root (common process)              
Levin, Lin & Chu                
Level  -5.353  (0.000)  -0.195  (0.422)  -7.791  (0.000)  1.789  (0.963) 
First difference  -6.259  (0.000)  -9.897  (0.000)  -6.586  (0.000)  -10.77  (0.000) 
Breitung                 
Level  7.602  (0.999)  3.465  (0.998)  6.055  (0.999)  5.573  (0.999) 
First difference  -8.195  (0.000)  -6.104  (0.000)  -8.018  (0.000)  -9.372  (0.000) 
                 
                          
Ho: Unit root (individual process)              
Im, Pesaran & Shin               
Level  2.415  (0.992)  4.348  (0.999)  0.786  0.7841  5.214  (0.999) 
First difference  -10.55  (0.000)  -10.99  (0.000)  -6.843  (0.000)  -11.44  (0.000) 
ADF - Fisher                  
Level  48.342  (0.378)  40.359  (0.706)  64.249  0.0388  18.037  (0.999) 
First difference  196.41  (0.000)  206.02  (0.000)  130.31  (0.000)  208.78  (0.000) 
Pesaran CIPS                 
P=1  -1.118        -1.337       
P=2  -1.457        -1.608       
P=3  -1.316        -1.585       
P=4  -1.316        -1.774       
                          
                 
Ho: No cointegration               
Pedroni - panel ADF      -3.042  (0.004)       
Pedroni - group ADF      -3.663  (0.001)       
Kao        -7.382  (0.000)       
                              9 
Our final methodological step starts from the general ARDL(p,q) model: 
(1)  it
q
k
k t i ik
p
k
k t i ik i i it PCY GEX t GEX e d l a a + + + + = ∑ ∑
=
-
=
-
0
,
1
, 1 0 , 
in which GEX stands for total general government expenditures and PCY for per-capita 
GDP, both expressed in logs. The index i tracks the cross-sectional dimension of the dataset 
from 1 to 23, while t is the time index running from 1970 to 2006. The traditional dynamic 
FE estimation imposes slope homogeneity in equation (1) by simply setting  k ik l l =  and 
k ik d d =  for each country; thus letting free only intercept and trend coefficients and 
neglecting the degree of stationarity of the time series.  
However, the model can be equivalently written in the error correction representation to 
disentangle long-run and short-run developments: 
(2)  it
q
k
k t i ik
p
k
k t i ik t i i t i i i i it PCY GEX PCY GEX t GEX e d l b f a a + D + D + + + + = D ∑ ∑
=
-
=
- - -
0
,
1
, 1 , 1 , 1 0 , 
where  i
i
i q
f
b
= -  stands for the long-run elasticity of public spending with respect to per-
capita GDP in each country. The MG procedure runs separate estimation of (2) for the 23 
economies and then averages the estimated coefficients across countries. In particular, we 
have for the long-run elasticity  MG
i
i q q = ∑
=
23
1 23
1
. The different approach of the PMG estimator 
is instead based on the homogeneity of this coefficient, so that for each economy we have 
q q = i . Nevertheless, the speed of adjustment to long-run disequilibria is let free to vary 
across countries. Thus, equation (2) can be rewritten as: 
(3)  ( ) it
q
k
k t i ik
p
k
k t i ik t i i i i i it PCY GEX PCY GEX t GEX e d l q f a a + D + D + - + + = D ∑ ∑
=
-
=
- -
0
,
1
, 1 1 0 . 
According to Wagner’s law the coefficient q  must be positive and, for the strict 
interpretation, larger than 1. In the next section we show the estimation results and all the 
relevant tests which prove that indeed Wagner’s law holds in our sample.     10 
4. Estimation results 
Pooled estimates of the long-run elasticity q  and the adjustment coefficient  i f  are reported 
in Table 2 under the Pooled Mean Group, the Mean Group and the Dynamic Fixed Effect 
method. The lags of both endogenous and exogenous variables on the right hand side of the 
ARDL model (3) are chosen according to the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion and are allowed to 
vary across countries. However, due to data constraints on the time series dimension of the 
data set we impose for both variables a maximum lag of 2 years.
4 
The long-run elasticity is estimated at a value just above unity, which is however 
significantly larger than one. In fact, due to a very small standard error, which in turn hints 
to a high estimation precision, even the estimated coefficient of 1.028 turns out to be 
statistically larger than one and thus support the strict Wagner’s law. In the long-run an 
increase of per-capita GDP is associated to a more than proportional increase in total 
government expenditures. The same evidence derives from the alternative MG and FE 
estimates: in both cases the long-run elasticity of government expenditures with respect to 
per-capita GDP is significantly larger than 1.  
Table 2  
Pooled estimates of baseline model 
   PMG  MG  FE 
       
long-run coefficient  1.0281  1.1273  1.1416 
 (std error)  (0.0093)  (0.0446)  (0.0051) 
adjustment coefficient  -0.2152  -0.3206  - 
 (std error)  (0.0330)  (0.0414)   
        
Hausman test  5.01     
(1% critical value)  (6.63)     
        
 
The adjustment coefficient is, as expected, negative and statistically different from zero, thus 
suggesting that any deviation of public spending from the value implied by the long-run 
equilibrium relationship with per-capita GDP brings about a correction in the opposite 
                                                           
4 This restriction will be released in the robustness section without any implication for the results of the 
paper.     11 
direction. In particular, the error correction coefficient is -0.22 under the PMG framework 
suggesting a relatively slow adjustment from lung-run disequilibria of between 4 to 5 years. 
Slightly larger is the same coefficient when estimated with the MG procedure. Finally, the 
Hausman test could not reject the null of equality of PMG and MG estimates, thus sustaining 
the homogeneous long-run coefficient hypothesis underling the PMG procedure and giving 
support to a broad validity of Wagner’s law across countries.    
Before looking at the PMG estimates of the short-run dynamics in each country, it is worth 
spending few words about the single economy specifications obtained through MG 
estimation.
5 The long-run elasticity of public expenditures ranges from 0.74 in Belgium to 
1.54 in Ireland. In the spirit of Wagner’s law all the economies which experienced a more 
sustained growth of per-capita GDP show an equilibrium elasticity above the average. For 
countries like Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain the needs of government to adjust the 
supply of public goods and services to a changing demand, adapt public sector 
remunerations, revise type and size of transfers to private sector and provide all the 
regulatory and protective actions needed to ensure the smooth workings of a modern, 
specialized economy were more stringent than in countries in which this evolution had 
started well in advance. In addition, the relatively high average short-run ECT coefficient 
(Table 2) hints for some countries to a fast adjustment of public spending to deviations from 
equilibrium. While the “average” OECD economy is able to get back on the level of 
government expenditures foreseen by the cointegrating relationship in about three years, for 
Iceland, Greece, Korea and Switzerland the process takes less than 2 years. 
A detailed picture of the PMG country-specific estimations is reported in Table 3. The 
ARDL model selection based on the Schwarz Criterion is reported in the second column of 
the table. The third column provides the adjusted R-square: 17 countries display a coefficient 
above ⅔ and only one below ½. A battery of diagnostic tests shows that there is little 
evidence of misspecification in any country-specific model. In particular, the fourth column 
reports that there is no residual serial correlation (Godfrey test), the fifth shows a functional 
form misspecification only for the UK, Germany and Korea (RESET test), the sixth suggests 
evidence of non-normal errors for Finland, Korea and Sweden (Jarque-Bera test), while the 
                                                           
5 For the sake of brevity, the results of the full Mean Group estimation procedure are not reported. They are 
available on request.     12 
last hints to heteroskedasticity in Australia, Finland, France, Japan and USA. All in all the 
general fit is fairly good. 
Table 3 
PMG estimation results 
  
Adjustment 
coefficient 
Lag 
select. 
Adjusted      
R-square 
Auto 
correl. 
Funct. 
form 
Errors 
Norm. 
Hetero
sked. 
Exoge
neity  
                   
Australia  -0.236  (0.05)  (2; 0)  0.73  1.72  0.01  0.36  8.24  4.66 
Austria  -0.214  (0.05)  (1; 0)  0.79  1.92  4.58  0.19  0.55  2.79 
Belgium  -0.176  (0.06)  (1; 2)  0.76  0.63  0.35  5.29  0.14  6.07 
Canada  -0.118  (0.05)  (2; 2)  0.84  1.53  1.28  0.03  2.82  12.61 
Denmark  -0.141  (0.06)  (2; 0)  0.68  3.38  3.43  3.79  6.47  2.32 
Finland  -0.135  (0.04)  (2; 0)  0.80  0.00  1.21  19.73  10.80  12.31 
France  -0.265  (0.05)  (2; 0)  0.91  1.38  0.12  0.25  13.43  1.64 
GBR  -0.395  (0.09)  (2; 2)  0.71  0.32  8.35  0.13  0.57  2.48 
Germany  -0.188  (0.06)  (1; 0)  0.59  1.84  21.48  5.18  4.06  1.94 
Greece  -0.100  (0.11)  (2; 0)  0.58  3.55  4.49  2.48  0.02  1.71 
Iceland  -0.804  (0.06)  (2; 2)  0.93  1.87  1.05  0.42  3.27  9.97 
Ireland  -0.179  (0.05)  (2; 0)  0.56  1.35  1.66  0.61  6.43  0.86 
Italy  -0.131  (0.04)  (2; 0)  0.91  0.16  2.67  0.56  0.72  0.66 
Japan  -0.225  (0.04)  (1; 0)  0.92  1.20  0.74  0.62  12.21  3.42 
Korea  -0.383  (0.01)  (2; 0)  0.55  3.64  13.33  34.51  1.34  9.93 
Netherlands  -0.372  (0.03)  (1; 1)  0.80  3.95  1.75  0.62  3.40  4.90 
N. Zealand  -0.103  (0.05)  (1; 2)  0.75  1.23  0.45  0.43  1.65  3.14 
Norway  -0.180  (0.03)  (2; 1)  0.81  0.07  0.31  0.50  0.03  7.50 
Portugal  -0.149  (0.09)  (1; 1)  0.88  0.77  0.05  0.60  1.50  3.53 
Spain  -0.019  (0.05)  (2; 1)  0.84  1.33  0.66  0.58  0.00  2.04 
Sweden  -0.148  (0.08)  (1; 1)  0.47  0.80  4.18  8.89  2.87  0.15 
Switzerland  -0.161  (0.04)  (1; 2)  0.50  1.01  3.71  1.33  6.57  1.18 
USA  -0.125  (0.04)  (2; 1)  0.67  0.04  0.00  1.62  10.32  1.87 
1% critical value        6.63  6.63  9.21  6.63  6.63 
                    
 
It is possible to observe that the speed of adjustment to the common equilibrium relationship 
differs largely across economies and it is significantly different from zero in all countries but     13 
Greece, Portugal and Spain. Note however that the latter circumstance is to be attributed to 
an estimated PMG long-run coefficient well below the one found in the single-country 
specifications. As explained above, the estimated value of the elasticity of government 
expenditures to GDP was much larger and always significant in Greece (1.40), Spain (1.25) 
and Portugal (1.10) than the common cointegrating value of 1.03. When switching to the 
common restriction of a single OECD elasticity the model simply could not adjust the 
difference. 
The ECT coefficient ranges from -0.1 in New Zealand to around -0.4 in UK, Korea and the 
Netherlands with a peak of -0.8 in Iceland. With the exception of the latter economy, the 
short-run dynamics hint, as expected, to an overall gradual adjustment of public spending to 
deviation from the equilibrium value predicted by the Wagner’s law. 
As already mentioned, the correct interpretation of Wagner’s statement about the link of 
government spending and economic development points to the existence of a positive 
correlation of the time-series which, however, does not imply a strong causality from one 
variable to the other. The idea was that the economic development was associated with an 
increased role of government activities, but Wagner himself did not provide an articulated 
model of the growth process in which cause and effect were clearly delineated. Nevertheless, 
in the empirical literature Wagner’s law has been often tested as a causality relationship 
from GDP growth to government expenditures. In this paper, the ARDL modeling technique 
employed is able to reduce the potential inefficiency introduced by the presence of 
endogenous variables. However, to shed some light on the direction of the long-run linkage 
we run a test of exogeneity on each country. The Wald exogeneity test results are reported in 
the last column of Table 3. Only for 5 countries the null hypothesis  that government 
expenditures contain no additional information about the long-run determination of per-
capita GDP (i.e., non-causality) could not be accepted. Thus there is ample evidence that 
per-capita GDP is weakly exogenous (or long-run forcing) to government expenditures and 
that the causality goes from the former to the latter variable. 
5. Robustness analysis 
The results of the PMG estimation provided clear evidence in favor of a strict Wagner’s law 
in our advanced economies sample. In this section we run several robustness check of the     14 
relation between public spending and GDP growth. The left-hand-side of Table 4 proposes 
three adjustments of the baseline estimation. We first considered a smaller sample of 21 
countries in which we did not include the two economies with the maximum and minimum 
estimated MG value for the long-run elasticity (Ireland and Belgium, respectively). We then 
let the model freely select the lag-length for each country according to the Schwarz Bayesian 
Criterion.
6 Finally, we consider demeaned variables in order to take into account possible 
cross-country errors’ correlation. The results confirm the goodness of the baseline 
estimation: the long-run elasticity of government expenditures with respect to per-capita 
GDP is always significantly larger than one, thus supporting Wagner’s law in its strict 
interpretation. Also the magnitude of the ECT coefficient is in line with the estimated 
horizon of 4 to 5 years to offset government disequilibrium spending levels. 
Table 4 
PMG estimates of alternative models 
           
 MODEL  elasticity  ECT coeff.   MODEL  elasticity  ECT coeff. 
            
        
 
     
No outliers  1.0278  -0.2187  Levels  1.0165  -0.1697 
   (0.0093)  (0.0362)     (0.0055)  (0.0317) 
Free lags  1.0188  -0.2669  Real variables  1.0911  -0.1605 
   (0.0053)  (0.0608)     (0.0455)  (0.0262) 
Demeaned  1.1474  -0.2248  EU-14  1.0574  -0.2720 
   (0.0194)  (0.0304)    (0.0221)  (0.0377) 
            
As mentioned earlier, there is not a unique way to measure both government spending and 
economic growth which is consistent with the Wagner’s law. However, some basic 
principles in the spirit of the law have to be followed (Peacock and Scott, 2000). Apart from 
the pair “nominal government expenditures” and “nominal per-capita GDP” we used in the 
previous section, there are two other possible strong candidates which have been often used 
in the empirical literature: “nominal government expenditures” and “nominal GDP”; “real 
government expenditures” and “real per-capita GDP”. The estimation results based on these 
                                                           
6 Only in five cases did the automatic selection reach a 4-lag length for at least one variable, suggesting that 
a lag order of two was generally enough for taking into account the short-run dynamics. This is not surprising 
given the already good fit of each single country estimation highlighted in the previous section. 
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two sets of variables are reported in RHS of Table 4. Again, a strict reading of the law of 
increasing state activity is suggested by a long-run elasticity significantly larger than one. 
Finally, we looked at the reduced sample of the 14 European Union countries. This sub-set is 
interesting since it is characterized by a common set of rules which goes beyond domestic 
legislation. In fact, in order to comply with the fiscal criteria established by the Maastricht 
Treaty, the majority of countries addressed the challenge of reducing the deficit/GDP ratio to 
the well-known 3% threshold within 1997.  In addition, the Stability and Growth Pact sets 
the rules to have medium term balanced budgets (or surpluses) across countries. The 
elasticity of government spending is slightly larger than the whole sample, but the difference 
is not statistically significant.
7 Indeed, it seems that the fiscal discipline which characterizes 
European countries at least since mid-1990s has not led to a different government spending 
evolution with respect to other advanced economies. Public spending and GDP growth are 
linked by a positive long-run relation fully consistent with the strict Wagner’s law. 
Figure 1 
Recursive pooled estimates of long-run elasticity 
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7 The same applies when dealing with the 11 countries of the Euro Area.     16 
A different robustness check is implemented via recursive estimates of  equations (2) and (3) 
to assess the stability of the model. We started from a 20-year sample and then added one 
year in each step. Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the PMG and MG estimates of the long-
run elasticity q . Even remaining always significantly larger than 1, the positive relation 
between government expenditures and per-capita GDP shows a clearly declining trend. 
When the expansion of the economy was stronger public spending was increasing in a 
proportionally larger fashion. On average over the 1970s and 1980s the rate of growth of 
per-capita GDP was faster than in the following decades and the elasticity of public 
expenditures was at 1.30. The subsequent reduction in the speed of development led to a 
significant decline also in the long-run elasticity, suggesting that the size of government 
might be somehow approaching a stable level in OECD countries. 
This development is supportive of the traditional interpretation of the positive correlation 
between the two variables. As already mentioned, Wagner’s idea was that the economic 
evolution of a country would call for an expanding role of the government because of the 
increased need of administrative controls, market supervision and education and welfare 
services. However, the time in which the German economist was operating was that of the 
emerging industrial society in which the economic development was characterized by strong 
changes in the structure of the whole country and steep increase in the wealth of nations. In 
our sample, even though in a very minor way, the first two decades might be still considered 
(at least with respect to the following years) as characterized by important economic 
changes. In a world of less buoyant development as that of the OECD economies in the last 
two decades the relation between government size and GDP growth might have weakened.  
While some public goods and services might still be considered as luxury and increase more 
than proportionally with (per-capita) GDP, other aspects put forward by Wagner to sustain 
the law might have weakened. Besides, issues which were not relevant at that time may 
become significant for the joint development of the two variables in the most recent period. 
As suggested by Shelton (2007), the increasing share of the population over 65 is strongly 
supporting the growth of government spending (and thus the positive correlation with per-
capita GDP) in many advanced economies since greying population calls for increased social 
security expenditures. In addition, there may also be at work a neglected supply-side 
explanation concerning the technology of taxation. The increasing share of public spending     17 
may be in fact related to an enhanced ability of raising taxes which allows the financing of 
the larger expenditures. 
6. Conclusion 
The paper has provided some new empirical evidence supporting the existence of a  long-run 
positive correlation between public spending and GDP growth in 23 OECD advanced 
economies. Within a well established body of research we contributed with results stemming 
from a very promising panel estimation technique which makes a broader use of the both the 
time-series and the cross-sectional dimension of the dataset. Even recently, the range of 
investigation has usually focused on single country experience (Islam 2001) or on 
comparison of several countries (Thornton; 1999, Akitoby et al.; 2006) based on country-by-
country time-series regressions. We instead provided a panel estimation which exploited also 
the cross-section dimension of the dataset to improve the estimation precision. 
In a first step we assessed the mean-reverting statistical properties of general government 
total expenditures and per-capita GDP time series. They turned out to be integrated of order 
1 so that we could test for a long-run cointegrating relationship, which indeed happened to 
exist.  We then set a panel ARDL model which was estimated via the pooled mean group 
(PMG) methodology proposed by Pesaran et al. (1999). This procedure is well suited to deal 
with testing the Wagner’s statement that economic development is associated to a more than 
proportional contemporaneous growth in government expenditures. From a statistical point 
of view, the PMG estimation exploits the cross-section dimension of the dataset by imposing 
the homogeneity of the long-run parameters, while allowing the short-run dynamic 
specification to vary across countries. In addition, both the equivalence across groups and 
the magnitude of the long-run elasticity can be easily tested in the PMG framework. The 
latter property has been exploited to distinguish between a loose and a strict economic 
interpretation of the Wagner’s law. 
The hypothesis that the long-run elasticity is equal across countries turned out to be viable 
for our sample, thus suggesting a common development among the 23 countries and the 
widespread validity of the Wagner’s law. In addition, the cointegrated term of the ARLD 
showed a coefficient linking the two variables which is statistically larger than one, 
supporting a strict interpretation of the law.     18 
This evidence is robust to different model specifications with respect to both the sample 
properties and variables’ definition. Even the sub-group of European countries, which are 
subject to a common set of supranational rules regarding public finances management, did 
not show a behavior which is statistically different from the whole sample. 
In the spirit of the law we also found that the long-run elasticity is usually higher in countries 
with lower per-capita GDP, suggesting that the catching-up period was characterized by a 
stronger development of government activities with respect to economies in a more 
advanced state of development.  
In addition, a recursive estimate showed a clear declining trend for the long-run correlation 
between public expenditures and GDP. Even maintaining a coefficient consistent with a 
more than proportional increase of the role of government in the economic activity of a 
country, the value is approaching the unit suggesting that maybe the relative weight of 
government in the set of OECD economies is close to a steady state value or even that the 
relative share may shrink below a one-to-one joint development.  
However, while traditional channels for the expanding role of government may be less 
effective, nowadays other factors may have contributed to the upholding of the law in the 
most recent period of relatively subdued growth in per-capita GDP. From the supply-side, it 
is possible to mention the increased ability of governments in collecting taxes and thus the 
relatively ease in financing growing expenditures, from the demand-side, most advanced 
economies witnessed a increasing demand of social securities services due to fast-ageing 
population. 
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